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The Consumer as King: The
Economics of Precarious Sovereignty
Robert L. Birmingham
My answer to the question, "Is the consumer sovereign?" is that
the consumer is at least as much a sovereign as Queen Elizabeth II
of England.
Katona, Long-Range Changes in Consumer Attitudes, in
Dynamic Aspects of Consumer Behavior 95, 103 (C.
Lininger ed. 1963).
There is something sacred about big business. Anything which is
economically right is morally right.
Henry Ford, quoted in A. Sinclair, Prohibition: The Era
of Excess 369 (1962).
Thru business, properly conceived, managed and conducted, the
human race is finally to be redeemed.
Purinton, Big Ideas from Big Business, The Independ-
ent, April 16, 1921, at 395, quoted in The Twenties -
Fords, Flappers & Fanatics 3-4 (G. Mowry ed. 1963).
I. INTRODUCTION
IECENTLY the Magazine Publishers Association, an associa-
' tion of 365 leading United States magazines, has sponsored
a group of advertisements advertising advertising. One of the most
popular of these, which ap-
peared in many mass-consump-THE AUTHOR: ROBERT L. BIRMING- tion magazines in the spring
HAM (A.B., LL.B., Ph.D. in Economics,
University of Pittsburgh; LL.M., Har- and summer of 1967, is a
yard University) is an Assistant Pro- Feiffer-like series of sketches
fessor of Law at Indiana University. set at a cocktail party.' A pro-
fessorial and hence hardly
virile-looking simpleton is depicted expounding his views on eco-
nomic planning to a young woman obviously drawn to illustrate
the ease of combining sexual attractiveness with the responsibilities
of motherhood:
Professor: Our economy is like a great complicated machine that
has too many moving parts!
I See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, April 10, 1967, at 101.
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Matron: We used to have a car like that.
Professor: I say simplify! Give the public one good TV ... one
soap . .. just one brand of everything.
Matron: I do hope it's a pink soap or maybe a nice yellow or...
Professor: Think what we'll save on promotion . . . advertising
... wasteful competition! The mind boggles.
Matron: When that happens to me, I take an aspirin or an "em-
pirin" or an "alka-seltzer." It depends.
Professor: Of course the government would see to it every product
met a certain standard.
Matron: And if they didn't, I'd simply switch to a better brand!
Professor: No, no!! Thousands of brands screaming to be bought
is a thing of the past. We must go beyond that.
Matron: You mean I couldn't choose things to buy the way I pick
a movie or a...
Professor: You wouldn't need to choose.
Matron: My husband and I passed through a charming little coun-
try just like that.
Professor: Really, which one?
Matron: Albania.
Elaboration is provided in text at the bottom of the page, appar-
ently to aid those missing the point but nevertheless literate:
If you're laughing at that fellow up above, we've got news for
you. He's serious!
There actually are people - well-meaning people - in this
country today who think the government should regulate the num-
ber of brands on the market.
Mrs. Smith is confused by all the varieties of soap on her su-
permarket shelf, they say. It would simplify things if there were
only four or five, they claim. Making shopping a whole lot
quicker and easier.
Of course, poor, little, mixed-up Mrs. Smith won't get to
choose which soaps go and which soaps stay. Seventeen years of
sharp-eyed, dose-fisted comparison shopping and product testing
apparently have left Mrs. Smith incapable of that judgment.
So, now she'll have friends in high places to do her shopping
for her. Lucky Mrs. Smith.
Let's hope they know Mrs. Smith has a 12-year-old with dry
skin. And a mauve bathroom.
Even disregarding the permissibility of travel through Albania at
the time of the trip, this advertisement raises interesting problems.
Our ideology asserts that maximization of satisfaction can best be
attained through vigilant protection preventing regulatory adultera-
tion of a largely mythical but nevertheless sacred market mecha-
nism. Consumer choice is held to be inviolable We blindly
2
"The ideology of laissez-faire outlived the structural reforms which changed
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assume that each person is endowed with an immutable set of
preferences dictating degrees of satisfaction associated with the
acquisition and use of various combinations of goods. Since dis-
covery of such pleasure schedules cannot be disassociated from
individual selection among proffered bundles of products, inter-
ference with this selection is generally deemed to reduce com-
munity utility. Claims of efficacy, however, do not stop here:
"[Wjithin the model of the free market lies one good chance of
smoothing the frictions which develop between men on the score
of religion, race, colour or social values. 'The market is a great
civilizer.' "
The increasing complexity of the modern market place has
rendered the unaided individual almost defenseless against modern
merchandising techniques. The head of a large department store
has stated: "God created the masses of mankind to be exploited.
I exploit them; I do his will."5  In a message to Congress delivered
February 5, 1964, President Johnson noted that "for far too long,
the consumer has had too little voice and too little weight in govern-
ment. As a worker, as a businessman, as a farmer, as a lawyer or
doctor, the citizen has been well represented. But as a consumer,
he has had to take a back seat."6
In spite of our ideological bias toward nonintervention, con-
cern for consumer impotence has inspired recent legislation designed
to redress the imbalance of power. In this article selected super-
stitions underlying our economic value judgments are briefly exam-
ined. Next, attention is focused on two statutes, the Fair Pack-
uncontrolled market economy. Indeed, the discrepancy between what many think we
ought to do - laissez-faire - and what we in fact are doing - creating a welfare
state - has not yet entirely disappeared in the United States." Dalton, Primitive,
Archaic, and Modern Economies: Karl Polanyi's Contribution to Economic Anthropo-
logy and Cornparative Economy, in ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 9 (J.
Helm ed. 1965).
a It can . . . be affirmed that thanks to the nonintervention of the state
in private affairs, wants and satisfactions would develop in their natural
order.... Away, then, with the quacks and the planners! Away with their
rings, their chains, their hooks, their pincers! Away with their artificial
methods! . . . Let us cast out all artificial systems and give freedom a
chance - freedom, which is an act of faith in God and in His handiwork.
F. BASTIAT, The Law, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 51, 53,
96 (G. de Huszar ed. 1964).
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMmERCE, DO You KNow YOUR ECONOMIC ABC's? - PROFITS
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 11-12 (1965).
4 J. JEWKES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 71 (1965).
5 Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1135 n.7
(1931).
6 Address by President Johnson, H.R. Doc. No. 220, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964).
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aging and Labeling Act and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966. After 'briefly describing each, I will attempt
to evaluate its purpose and impact in the light of economic theory.
H. EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMALITY
Pareto optimality - economic equilibrium such that with given
community resources no person can be made better off without
injury to another - will result if: perfect competition prevails;
there are constant returns to scale; and there are no external econo-
mies or diseconomies with respect to production or consumption.
The Platonic ideal of a perfectly competitive commodity market re-
quires that:
(1) firms produce a homogeneous commodity, and consumers
are identical from the sellers' point of view, in that there are no ad-
vantages or disadvantages associated with selling to a particular
consumer;
(2) both firms and consumers are numerous, and the sales or
purchases of each individual unit are small in relation to the ag-
gregate volume of transactions;
(3) both firms and consumers possess perfect information
about the prevailing price and current bids, and they take advan-
tage of every opportunity to increase profits and utility respectively;
(4) entry into and exit from the market is free for both
firms and consumers.8
Perfectly competitive factor markets must satisfy similarly rigorous
conditions. All markets must be linked by perfect knowledge of
the characteristics of their products or factors.
The basic assumptions of the model inherently connote a lack
of realism. Not only are its requirements unattainable, but
attempts to avoid unnecessary divergence from its norms cannot
be justified without further detailed argument. If some aspects
of a system are constrained to non-maximizing levels, there is no
a priori basis for asserting that satisfaction of other conditions of
optimality will necessarily prove advantageous.9
The optimality of competitive equilibrium merely assures effi-
ciency. In the general case welfare will not be maximized:
Perfect competition represents a welfare optimum in the narrow
sense of fulfilling the requirements of Pareto optimality .... An
7 See P. SAMUELSON, The Economic Role of Private Activity, in 2 COLLECrED
ScIENTIFIc PAPERS 1419, 1422 (J. Stiglitz ed. 1966).
s J. HENDERSON & 1P QuANT, MlcaoEcoNozsc THEoRY 86 (1958).
9 Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. EcoN. STUD.
11 (1956).
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additional difficulty is introduced by the fact that the analysis of
Pareto optimality accepts the prevailing income distribution ....
The problem of finding an optimal income distribution is not con-
sidered. . . . The analysis of welfare in terms of Pareto optimality
leaves a considerable amount of indeterminacy in the solution:
there are an infinite number of points . . . which are Pareto-opti-
mal .... In order to judge the relative social desirability of alterna-
tive points . . . society must make additional value judgments
which state its preferences among alternative ways of allocating sat-
isfaction to individuals. Value judgments are ethical beliefs and
are not the subject of economic analysis.' 0
Our interest concentrates on the ability of the consumer, assum-
ing satisfaction of other conditions necessary for optimization, to
choose from the available goods that combination which, given
his income, will yield him the most pleasure. Plot quantities of
two desired goods, Gt and G2, along the horizontal and vertical
axes of Figure 1. Then any point (for example, point A) within
the quadrant will denote a unique combination of the two goods
having a definite value -to an individual. The individual, offered
a choice between combinations of goods represented by any two
points, will either prefer one to the other or be indifferent as to
which he obtains. Ordinarily, we would expect a person to value
the combination designated by point B more highly than that of
point A, because the former contains more of each good. The locus
of all combinations of goods from which the consumer derives equal
satisfaction is called an indifference curve. Assuming infinite divisi-
bility of both goods, each point along or between the axes will lie
on some indifference curve. Three such curves, 11, 12, and 13, are
drawn in Figure 1. The individual will prefer a position on I3 to
one on 12, and would rather be on 12 than on Li."
Limited resources normally prevent the consumer from obtain-
ing satiating amounts of the goods in question. Combinations
available to him will be limited to those on or below and to the
left of a budget constraint, such as line xy in Figure 1. From the
combinations which he can afford the individual will choose that
usually unique one which will yield him the greatest satisfaction. If
choice is unhampered, he will locate at point A, where budget
10 J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, supra note 8, at 208. See also P. SAMUELSON,
Modern Economic Realities and Individualism, in 2 COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS
1407, 1410 (J. Stiglitz ed. 1966).
1 1 The curves are convex to the origin because acquisition of increasing quantities
of a good will normally render it less valuable in terms of other goods possessed in
unchanging amounts.
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FIGURE 1.
constraint xy is tangent to indifference curve 12, the highest indif-
ference curve he can reach.
Since goods are valuable for the enjoyment they yield, it is
possible to consider them merely combinations of qualities which
themselves form more basic units of personal satisfaction. Con-
sumer behavior, therefore, can be explained with reference to choice
among combinations of these qualities in a manner paralleling our
analysis of choice among combinations of goods. Thus we can
measure quantities of two -desired qualities rather than quantities of
two desired goods along the horizontal and vertical axes of Figure
1. Assuming perfect information concerning the qualities asso-
ciated with each good, unrestricted consumer choice will by a now
familiar process again yield equilibrium at point A.'
12 See Fels, Hedonistic Calculus as Seen from a Distance, 91 'WBLTWIRTSCHAFT-
LicHES Axc~i-v 101, 108 (1963). "Instead of assuming that we have built-in sched-
ules upon which all existing or potential objects are listed in order of preference, let
us think of the individual having 'wants.' These 'wants' are not specific, but specific
objects and services fulfill them to varying degrees." G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A
MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 7 (1967).
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III. INFORMATION
A. Legislation
The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 3 the product of partially
abortive efforts by Michigan's Senator Hart and others to reduce
consumer confusion caused by misleading marketing practices,
became effective on July 1, 1967. Some indication of the antici-
pated impact of the regulations as originally formulated can be
garnered from the ferocity of industry opposition to their enact-
ment. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce stated:
Inescapably, one concludes the Hart bill is not really aimed at con-
sumer protection, for that's already available in existing law. The
measure is little more than a federal grab for power to make de-
cisions that heretofore have been made by consumers and by busi-
ness - a power grab based on the fallacious concepts that the con-
sumer is Casper Milquetoast, Business is Al Capone, and govern-
ment is Superman. 14
A representative of the National Association of Manufacturers
argued that "[the inevitable effect of the bill will be to roll back
the packaging and marketing revolution of this generation. Had
we lived in recent years under such a law, we would not buy our
products as fresh, as clean, as unbroken or unspoiled, as accurately
measured, as easily handled or as cheaply as we do today."' 5  Such
resulting national disasters as a requirement that the holes in "Life
Savers" be filled were predicted. 6 A resolution against passage
was adopted by the American Bar Association, whose seven-man
Advisory Committee of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Division of
the Corporation, Banking, and Business Section included several
attorneys associated with the food industry."
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. 1967).
14 MICIGAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL LEGISLATION REPORT 2 (1965).
"What Salem did for its witches in 1692 may yet become a minute affair in comparison
to the trial taking shape for the food industry." A. MOwBRAY, THE THUMB ON THE
SCALE: OR THE SUPERMARKET SHELL GAME 159 (1967).
15Hearings on Packaging and Labeling Legislation Before the Senate Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 565 (1963).
'0Hearings on Fair Packaging and Labeling Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 639 (1965).
171Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers' Economic Interests Be
Enacted?, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1255, 1266 (1966). The bill which became the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964), was subjected to
similarly vituperative attacks. A spokesman for the Proprietary Association asserted:
"The only manner in which the present bill could be properly amended is to strike
out all after the enacting clause .... I have never in my life read a bill or heard of
a bill so grotesque in terms, evil in its purposes and vicious in its possible conse-
quences as this bill would be if enacted." Hearings on Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics
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Section 1451 recites the sources of congressional inspiration:
Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient func-
tioning of a free market economy. Packages and their labels
should enable consumers to obtain accurate information as to the
quantity of the contents and should facilitate value comparisons.
Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to
assist consumers and manufacturers in reaching these goals in the
marketing of consumer goods.3S
The means used to effectuate this policy, significantly less drastic
than those initially proposed, 9 seem ,hardly calculated to destroy
even those surviving fragments of our capitalistic system. The
Act subjects to control "consumer commodities," broadly defined
by section 1459 to include:
any food, drug, device, or cosmetic.., and any other article, prod-
uct, or commodity.. . customarily produced or distributed for sale
through retail sales agencies or instrumentalities for consumption
by individuals, or use by individuals for purposes of personal care
or in the performance of services ordinarily rendered within the
household, and which usually is consumed or expended in the
course of such consumption or use... 20
Among goods specifically excluded from regulation are meat, poul-
try, tobacco products, and rat poison.
Section 1454 vests regulatory power in the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, when the consumer commodity is a food,
drug, device, or cosmetic, or the Federal Trade Commission, if it
is not. These authorities are directed by section 1453 to promul-
gate regulations providing that:
(1) The commodity shall bear a label specifying the identity of
the commodity and the name and place of business of the manu-
facturer, packer, or distributor;
(2) The net quantity of contents (in terms of weight, measure,
or numerical count) shall be separately and accurately stated in a
uniform location upon the principal display panel of that
label ... 21
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 172
(1933). The Drug, Chemical, and Allied Trade Section of the New York Board of
Trade proclaimed: "The 'Tugwell' Food and Drug Bill is anti-NRA. It will seriously
affect employment and morale in the industries indicated. It will put thousands of
men and women out of work. It will close dozens of manufacturing plants and hun-
dreds of stores. It will hurt thousands. It will help none." Id. at 471. See Hart,
supra at 1264-65.
18 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. 1967).
19 "T]he battle ended in victory for the food manufacturers." A. MowBRAY, supra
note 14, at 5.
20 15 U.S.C. § 1459 (Supp. 1967).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1453(1)-(2) (Supp. 1967).
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Additional paragraphs seek to avoid consumer confusion through
establishing standards of clarity. Thus quantities contained "shall
appear in conspicuous and easily legible type in distinct contrast
.. . with other matter on the package,"2 and "shall be so placed
that the lines of printed matter... are generally parallel to the base
on which the package rests as it is designed to be displayed.. .. "'
In some cases decimal fractions of a pound may not be carried out
to more than two places.24
If compliance is impracticable or unnecessary, section 1454
allows the authorities to exempt classes of commodities from
requirements of section 1453. Additional duties include preven-
tion of "nonfunctional-slack-fill of packages" when "necessary to
prevent the deception of consumers or to facilitate value compari-
sons as to any consumer commodity . . . ." A package is to be
considered "nonfunctionally slack-filled" only "if it is filled to
substantially less than its capacity for reasons other than (A) pro-
tection of the contents of such package or (B) the requirements
of machines used for enclosing the contents in such package."25
Section 1454(d) states:
Whenever the Secretary of Commerce determines that there is
undue proliferation of the weights, measures, or quantities in
which any consumer commodity or reasonably comparable con-
sumer commodities are being distributed in packages for sale at
retail and such undue proliferation impairs the reasonable ability
of consumers to make value comparisons with respect to such con-
sumer commodity or commodities, he shall request manufacturers,
packers, and distributors of the commodity or commodities to par-
ticipate in the development of a voluntary product standard for
such commodity or commodities under the procedures for the de-
velopment of voluntary products standards established by the Sec-
retary .... Such procedures shall provide adequate manufacturer,
packer, distributor, and consumer representation.26
The absence of penalties for noncompliance assures that standardi-
zation programs are truly voluntary:
(e) If (1) after one year after the date on which the Secretary
of Commerce first makes the request of manufacturers, packers,
221d. § 1453(3) (B).
231d. § 1453(3) (D).
24 "I remember telling [my mother's mother, Lady Stanley of Alderley] that I had
grown 2 inches in the last seven months, and that at that rate I should grow 4 2/7
inches in a year. 'Don't you know,' she said, 'that you should never talk about any
fractions except halves and quarters? - it is pedantic!' " B. RUSSELL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY
33 (1967).
25 15 U.S.C. § 1454(c) (Supp. 1967).
261Id. § 1454(d).
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and distributors to participate in the development of a voluntary
product standard... he determines that such a standard will not
be published ...or (2) if such a standard is published and the
Secretary of Commerce determines that it has not been observed,
he shall promptly report such determination to the Congress with
a statement of the efforts that have been made under the voluntary
standards program and his recommendation as to whether Congress
should enact legislation providing regulatory authority to deal with
the situation in question,2 7
Judicial review of regulations issued pursuant to the Act is
authorized in section 1455. Section 1456 declares misbranded
within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
"[alny consumer commodity which is a food, drug, device, or cos-
metc... introduced or delivered for introduction into commerce"
in disregard of established standards. Similarly, nonconformity in
the packaging of other consumer commodities is to be deemed "an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce" in violation of sec-
tion 5 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act2
B. Theory
Unfortunately equilibrium as depicted in Figure 1 is seldom
achieved. Preference patterns which govern purchases are a com-
bination of basic wants and beliefs concerning the characteristics
of various products. Product purchases in turn are the means by
which basic wants are satisfied. Selection of that combination of
goods represented by point A in Figure 1 is axiomatic: argument
for any alternative choice normally degenerates to an assertion that
the relevant indifference curves should be differently drawn.29 The
271d. 5 1454(e).
28 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
29 The problem is of course much more complex. See, e.g., Richter, Revealed
Preference Theory, 34 EcoNoMErucA 635 (1966). Modern discussions of consumer
behavior need not formulate a refutable concept of satisfaction:
Neoclassical "utility" was a kind of economic ether: an element whose assumed
existence was merely a convenient medium for the analytical transmission of
the observable phenomena of consumer choice. Since other means have
proved capable of yielding the same predictions of these phenomena, the
assumption of its existence is simply not needed. To assert this is not to deny
that operational theorems about consumer behavior can be obtained from
the neoclassical theory, nor that they can be tested against reality. We may
merely derive most of these theorems without this 'subjective ether. R.
KuENNE, THE THEORY OF GENERAL ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM 54 (1963).
Enjoyment as a goal is itself not unobjectionable:
Suppose that it were discovered that a state of pleasure is always associated
with a particular kind of space-time pattern of electromagnetic field, or other
physical system, and that we were capable of producing such patterns in the
laboratory. . . . Would we be justified in spending a large part of the
world's resources in producing pleasure-fields of high intensity? ... Should
19691
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problem is that point A generally does not represent an optimum
with respect to the satisfaction of underlying desires.
The assumption of perfect information required by the com-
petitive model is obviously unrealistic. In a recent test, 33 young
married women with at least 1 year of college and 1 year of regular
shopping experience were given nearly 21 minutes per item to se-
lect 20 best buys among items typically stocked by supermarkets.
They chose incorrectly 43 percent of the time, spending an average
of almost 10 percent more than necessary. Nevertheless, "the aver-
age shopper sweeps past the 8,000 products found in the store and
buys 32 items in 15 to 18 minutes .... ."'
The merchant is of course more interested in selling his prod-
uct than in creating a knowledgeable noncustomer. A. C. Fuller,
founder of the Fuller Brush Company, stated:
The American housewife is an intelligent buyer . . . . The
greatest safeguard she has ... is in shopping around from store to
store ....
This shopping impulse arises the moment she considers buying
anything, and the house-to-house salesman must stifle it, if he can.
He is giving his customer no opportunity to compare values or to
postpone buying. "Do it now," he tells her, "I won't be back this
way for a couple of months." She buys, when she buys, against an
inner voice of discretion which tells her to wait until she can com-
pare values.3 '
we breed billions of rats and supply them each with a pleasure-producing
machine? Good, A Problem for the Hedonist, in THE SCIENTIST SPEc-
ULATES--AN ANTHOLOGY OF PARTLY-BAKED IDEAS 199, 200 (I. Good ed.
1962).
As an alternative to altruistic hedonism that author suggests as a possible goal "that
we should maximise the chance that the human race should be immortal." Id. at 200.
30 112 CONG. REC 11,507 (daily ed. June 2, 1966). See id. at 12,169-72. Potato
chips may be purchased in packages of 71 different weights, all under 3 /2 pounds.
Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1203, 1229 n.76 (1966).
"A cursory review of packaged salted nuts in a neighborhood supermarket turned up
two brands of different varieties, packed in net weights of 2V8, 23/, 3Y, 4, 4V, 5V4,
5N, 5 , 6, 63a, 7, 7 , 8, and 11 ounces, and all of them priced to end in 'nines' -
at 29, 39, 49, or 59 cents a package." C. BELL, CONSUMER CHOICE IN THE AMERI-
CAN ECONOMY 335 (1967).
Since inspection is normally cursory, advertisers frequently attempt to distinguish
their product from those of competitors by stressing as implicitly unique qualities
which all brands share.
Platformate is the ingredient which Shell says puts more mileage into the
gasoline gallon. What Shell did not say is that Platformate, or its equivalent,
is present in virtually every gasoline refined. When we asked about this,
Shell spokesman said only: 'We have never claimed that Platformate was an
exclusive ingredient.' Statement in Program on Gasoline Produced by Na-
tional Educational Television, Dec. 1966, quoted in Sloane, Advertising:
Platformate Fuels German Tiff, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1967, at 53, col. 3.
31 Fuller, Where Are We Headed in House-to-House Selling?, 52 MIAGAZINE OF
BUS. 703, 705 (1927), quoted in Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE
L.J. 745, 781 (1967).
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Packaging is definitely an important instrument of persuasion:
"I'm like a child. If you fix things up pretty, I'll buy them."ta
Opportunities for manipulation are not disregarded: "[Tlhree moti-
vating factors for a successful packaging program are consumer
needs, desires and weaknesses. 'Consumer weakness includes the
embellishments assigned to a package .... They add little or
nothing to the functional aspects of the package, nothing to the
product, but -to a large measure they create the impulse for pur-
chasing.' 23
Unwillingness to seek information before purchase often seems
condemned as almost immoral indifference on the part of the
individual. 4 A possible consequence of such an attitude is the
assertion that if consumers are foolish enough to purchase blindly
they do not deserve legislation which attempts to relieve them
of the consequences of their stupidity. Such an approach advocates
a needless sacrifice of welfare. Also, it frequently disregards the
fact that information, an economic good like any other, can usually
be acquired only through relinquishment of some alternative value.
Information concerning the optimal level of information one should
seek is likewise not costless.35
3 2 Statement by a housewife, quoted in Nelson, Seven Principles in Image Forma-
tion, 26 J. MARKETING 67, 69 (1962), reprinted in CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND THE
BEHAVIORAL ScOENcES 365, 366 (S. Britt ed. 1966).
3 3 PRINTERS' INK, Oct. 18, 1963, at 20.
34 "If anyone is so foolish as to enter into an agreement such as this, I do not know
that his case can be considered harsh." Statement by a British judge, quoted in M.
MAYER, THE LAWYERS 283 (1967). Admittedly ignorance frequently appears unwar-
ranted:
Reporter: Twiggy, do you know what happened at Hiroshima?
Twiggy: Where's that?
Reporter: In Japan.
Twiggy: No. rve never heard of it. What happened there?
Reporter: A hundred thousand people died on the spot, all at the same time.
Twiggy: Oh, God! When did you say it happened? Where? Hiroshima?
But that's ghastly. A hundred thousand dead? It's frightful. Men
are mad.
Seventh Annual Dubious Achievement Awards for 1967, ESQUIRE, Jan.
1968, at 49, 53.
35 Pathetic examples of consumer inefficiency abound:
Eight years ago, Mrs. Phillips sent a radio to be repaired. The bill came
to $8.90. Mrs. Phillips refused to pay - she thought it was going to cost
only $1. She sent her 20-year-old son to get the radio back. But John, an
easy mark for a fast sales talk, came home with a new radio, for which he had
agreed to pay in $1.25 weekly installments. The radio-shop owner, chubby
A. M. Pearson, got Mrs. Phillips to sign the contract.
When Mrs. Phillips fell into arrears on her payments, Radioman Pear-
son went to court and got a judgment which ordered her to give back the
radio and pay him $81.50 in court costs and collection fees.
Mrs. Phillips gave up the radio, but could not pay the rest. In August
1969]
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Lack of full knowledge of product characteristics will normally
prevent a consumer from acquiring that combination of goods
of greatest benefit to him. An error in estimating the character-
istics of a product will lead to preference patterns with respect to
goods which do not accurately reflect preferences as to qualities.
In Figure 2 the individual is shown initially to have achieved an
equilibrium with respect to goods identical to that of Figure 1. He
has selected that combination of products represented by point A,
where indifference curve 12 is tangent to budget constraint xy. If
he is only imperfectly aware of the characteristics of the products,
FIGuRE 2
1943, Pearson had the city marshall sell off Mrs. Phillips' assets - her house
and lot - to satisfy the court order. Pearson was the only bidder, and he
offered $26.50. A year later, as required by law, the marshall delivered the
deed to Pearson. During these twelve months, Mrs. Phillips could have kept
her home by paying the $26.50 plus a $25 marshall's fee. She says
nobody told her that.
Last week Pearson had the unrepaired radio, the "new" radio which he
sold her son, a still unsatisfied claim for $55, and the house and lot. (He
was willing to let Mrs. Phillips stay on - at $10 a week rent.) TIME, March
28, 1949, at 23.
See also Luck of Clarence Jackson, TIMB, Sept. 1, 1967, at 64.
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however, he will generally not have succeeded in satisfying his
more fundamental desires as fully as his income permits.
The purpose of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act and
similar statutes is to facilitate attainment of a higher level of con-
sumer satisfaction. To accomplish this the government seeks to
assure a supply of information which permits an individual to evalu-
ate more correctly the goods available for purchase. Reduction of
error in perceiving the qualities associated with various products
will transform the preference pattern depicted in Figure 2, result-
ing in a set of revised indifference curves including, say, IN and
and r2. Point A, now situated on iLi, is no longer an equilibrium
position. Now the consumer will choose that combination of goods
represented by point B, where a higher indifference curve, 1 2, is
tangent to the budget constraint. The consumer's welfare has in-
creased, since purchases now more nearly satisfy his basic desires.
IV. COERCION
A. Legislation
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act " became
law on September 9, 1966. The preamble of the Act declares its
purpose to be "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries
to persons resulting from traffic accidents." In order to achieve
this end section 1392 authorizes establishment of "appropriate
Federal motor vehicle safety standards." This task, originally
entrusted to the Department of Commerce, that traditional bul-
wark against the ravages of industrial octopi, has been. transferred
to the National Highway Safety Bureau, a division of the newly
created Department of Transportation. The first set of safety
standards, issued in early 1967, became effective January 1, 1968.
The controls apply to all motor vehicles manufactured after Decem-
ber 31, 1967. Additional restrictions will be similarly imposed on
1969 and 1970 output.3
7
Under section 1393 the Secretary is directed to form a National
Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory Council." The Secretary must
36 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. 1967).
3 7 Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. S§ 165 1-57 (Supp. 1967); Exec.
Order No. 11,357, 32 Fed. Reg. 8225 (1967); N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1968, at 31,
col. 1; id. Dec. 27, 1967, at 14, col. 3.
38A majority of the Council must be "representatives of the general public, includ-
ing representatives of state and local governments ...... The balance of the Council
comprises "representatives of motor vehicle manufacturers, motor vehicle equipment
manufacturers, and motor vehicle dealers." 15 U.S.C. § 1393 (a) (Supp. 1967).
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consult with this body before issuing safety standards. A "research,
testing, development, and training" program will provide him with
an additional basis for decision. 9
Section 1397 provides:
No person shall . . . manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or
introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or im-
port into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor
vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable
Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect ... unless it is in
conformity with such standard .... 40
A qualification exempts trade in used vehiles from this prohibi-
tion. Section 1398 establishes a civil penalty for violations not
exceeding $1000 per vehicle or piece of equipment involved, to a
maximum of $400,000 for any related series of violations. In
addition, section 1399 permits the Secretary to apply to a United
States District Court for an injunction restraining prohibited con-
duct. Section 1400 requires a manufacturer or distributor to repur-
chase offending vehicles from a distributor or dealer. Under sec-
tion 1402 manufacturers must notify purchasers of defects in ve-
hicles already sold within a reasonable time after their discovery. Of
course, common law liability for defective products is not pre-
cluded by adhering to standards issued by the Secretary.
Special provisions promoting tire safety are designed to assure
a supply of information to the consumer through controls similar
to those of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act. Thus section
1421 directs:
In all standards for pneumatic tires . . . the Secretary shall require
that tires subject thereto be permanently and conspicuously labeled
with such safety information as he determines to be necessary ....
Such labeling shall include -
(1) suitable identification of the manufacturer, or in the case of
a retreaded tire suitable identification of the retreader, unless
the tire contains a brand name other than the name of the
manufacturer in which case it shall also contain a code mark
which would permit the seller of such tire to identify the
manufacturer thereof to the purchaser upon his request.(2) the composition of the material used in the ply of the tire.
(3) the actual number of plies in the tire.
(4) the maximum permissible load for the tire.
(5) a recital that the tire conforms to Federal minimum safe
performance standards, except that in lieu of such recital the
Secretary may prescribe an appropriate mark or symbol for
3 The establishment of such a program is required by the Act. Id. § 1395 (a).
401d. § 1397(a)(1).
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use by those manufacturers or retreaders who comply with
such standards.
The Secretary may require that additional safety related informa-
tion be disclosed to the purchaser of a tire at the time of sale of
the tire.41
Section 1423 adds:
In order to assist the consumer to make an informed choice in the
purchase of motor vehicle tires, within two years after September 9,
1966, the Secretary shall. . . prescribe by order, and publish in the
Federal Register, a uniform quality grading system for motor ve-
hile tires... . The Secretary shall also cooperate with industry and
the Federal Trade Commission to the maximum extent practicable
in efforts to eliminate deceptive and confusing tire nomenclature
and marketing practices.42
B. Theory
The principles underlying provisions of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act which promote consumer knowledge
of tire characteristics parallel those generating the Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act and require no further explanation. Sections
compelling adherence by manufacturers to externally imposed con-
struction standards, however, add an element of coercion inconsis-
tent with reliance on competitive processes. In this section, I
examine the reasons for, and impact of, such interference with
market mechanisms.
Legislative motivation sufficiently strong to support passage
may be isolated without appeal to economic analysis. Little
thought is needed to construct a simplistic explanatory syllogism.
Automobile accidents are the leading cause of death to Americans
between -the ages of 5 and 3 0 ;4a resulting damage 'is estimated to
have exceeded 2 percent of national income in 1964.44 Safer
automobiles can be produced: frequent impalement by tailfins can
be avoided even without extensive sacrifice of aesthetic values.
Yet manufacturers, more -intent on stylistic modification, 41 seem
unwilling voluntarily to adopt high safety standards. Therefore
411Id § 1421.
421d. § 1423.
43 Boyd & Claycamp, Industrial Self-Regulation and the Public Interest, 64 McIr.
L. REv. 1239, 1245 (1966).
4 4 R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED at viii (Grossman Press ed. 1965).
45 "Styling's precedence over engineering safety is well illustrated by this statement
in a General Motors' engineering journal: 'The choice of latching means and actuating
means, or handles, is also dictated by styling requirements. Changes in body style
will continue to force redesign of door locks and handles.'" Id. at 211.
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public action is required. On a more subjective level, the Act can
be viewed as belated populist harassment of the corporate enemy
or as symbolic rebellion against parental authority.
Nevertheless, there remains a sound basis in economic theory
for legislative action. We have seen that the competitive model
generally produces efficient equilibrium only in the absence of
external economies or diseconomies. Such externalities "may be
said to arise when relevant effects on production or welfare go
wholly or partially unpriced."" "Under these conditions, since
each individual's actions have effects on others which he does not
take into account in making his decision, there is a prima facie
case for intervention."" Environmental pollution currently fur-
nishes the most important example of external effects. In the
absence of legal controls the self-seeking entrepreneur of Smithian
analysis may disregard the impact of emission of smoke and other
waste on public sensibilities, because he need not compensate others
for their discomfort.
Since an unsafe automobile endangers its owner, one would
expect a prospective purchaser to balance safety considerations with
other values, such as inexpensiveness and potency of sexual sym-
bolism.48 The worth of life is normally insufficient to motivate
acquisition of a Sherman tank.49 The individual will attempt to
purchase equipment which, given his resources, will provide him
the greatest satisfaction.
Externalities arise because an unsafe automobile threatens
others besides its owner. While most persons would derive dis-
pleasure or at least inconvenience from causing injury to others,
the extent of their disutility will hardly match that of their victims.
Insurance costs or awards of damages are but imperfect attempts
to incorporate diseconomies into driver preference functions and
are mere transfer payments which distribute but do not eliminate
the loss caused by accidents to society as a whole. The National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act can be deemed to serve a
function similar to nuisance doctrines or smoke control legislation.
46 E. MISHAN, Reflections on Recent Developments in the Concept of Exte nal Ef-
fects, in WELFARE ECONOMICS 98, 103 (1964).
47 p. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 208 (1964).
4 8 
"One woman wrote to the company to confide that the 'Mustang is as exciting
as sex.'" R. NADER, supra note 44, at 218.
49 See generally Rottenberg, Liability in Law and Economics, 55 AM. EcoN. REv. 107
(1965).
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Regard for the safety of those other than owners undoubtedly played
a role in its enactment."
The controls of the statute can be defended by arguing that
the effects of individual ignorance can be counterbalanced at the
least cost not by assuring a supply of information but by pre-
cluding deviation from that equilibrium which a person would
select if 'he were informed. Such a technique would be merely an
alternative means of achieving equilibrium at point B in Figure 2.
As such it receives qualified support from the classical economists:
If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting
to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and
there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize
him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his
liberty: for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does
not desire to fall into the river.51
The legislation nevertheless seems partially a product of pater-
nalistic concern that the consumer, no matter how well informed,
is incapable of adequately defining his own preference function.
There is some historical support for a claim that Americans have
an irrational preference for speed over safety. In 1838 steam-
boatmen, admitting frequent negligence, nevertheless blamed con-
sumer demand for many river accidents:
[Tjhe public have, themselves, contributed in no inconsiderable
degree, to increase the evil, not only by newspaper puffs, but by
the constant desire which a large portion of those who travel on
steamboats, manifest to "go on the fastest" and even to urge an
increase of speed. Is it wonderful then that under such circum-
stances some commanders should be induced to force their boats
beyond the bounds of safety, when great patronage and applause
are the rewards for the risk incurred? This morbid appetite among
travelers for "going ahead" is probably one of the greatest causes
of the evils. 52
Boorstin comments:
Apocryphal stories abounded; how passengers who had not yet
paid their fare were sent to the after part of the vessel, where as
assets, they would be least in danger from explosion; how Irish-
men were preferred to slaves as firemen, because their deaths
brought no financial loss to the management. Unembroidered
reality was terrifying enough. In the twenty-five years before mid-
50 
"[O]ne of the problems we have is the pedestrian.... There are about 500,000
pedestrians injured; 8,000 pedestrians are killed every year." Statement by Senator
Ribicoff, quoted in IL NADER, supra note 44, at 221.
5 1 J.S. MiLL, On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WoRKs 249, 342 (M. Lerner ed. 1961).
52 Quoted in D. BooRsT N, THE AmmucANs - THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 101
(1965).
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century, there were at least one hundred and fifty major explosions
on steamboats on western rivers, in which altogether no less than
fourteen hundred people were killed.5 3
By the middle of the 19th century the railroad had replaced the
steamboat as the most dramatically destructive means of transpor-
tation. Some Americans appear to have accepted the dangers of
technological progress with remarkable equanimity:
Alfred Bunn, an English theatrical manager traveling here in 1851,
reported in amazement that a friend of his who had failed to un-
load a parcel from a train at the depot near his house was un-
perturbed, because he knew the train usually had an accident a mile
farther on. Sure enough it did, and he unloaded his parcel then.5 4
Many believe the moder driver a worthy successor to the
early American traveler; observers have found "little evidence to
suggest that consumers make brand choices on the basis of safety."55
Promotional efforts stress other values: "Ever prodded a throttle
with 445-pound-feet of torque coiled tightly at the end of it? Do
that with one of these and you can start billing yourself as The
Human Cannonball."56  As Kessler notes, "marketing techniques
attempt, on the whole successfully, to make sure that fear of acci-
dents does not influence consumer choice." 57
Nineteenth-century libertarians sharply criticized government
controls preventing purportedly irrational individual behavior.
John Stuart Mill asserted as a fundamental maxim "that the indi-
vidual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as
these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice,
instruction, persuasion, and avoidance . . . are the only measures
5
3 Id.
54 Id. at 104. See J. VERNE, Round the World in Eighty Days, in 7 WoRKS 153,
295-98 (C. Home ed. 1911).
55 Boyd & Claycamp, supra note 43, at 1246. "Chevrolet general manager Edward
Cole said in 1959, 'One of the startling problems so far as crash injury is concerned
is the utter refusal on the part of the American motorists to be strapped into a seat
by a safety belt or a shoulder harness .... [The sale of these safety features is
practically nil, indicating a real disinterest on the part of the public in their own
safety.'" R. NADER, supra note 44, at 119. Such attitudes have been celebrated as
products of personal liberty: "[I]n a democracy, a citizen has an inalienable right
to be different; and, in this instance, the difference is the consumer's deviation from
rationality as the foundation of her buying decisions .... The facade of complete
rationality seems to be gone forever - whether we like it or not." Statement by
Roy King, quoted in A. MOWBRAY, supra note 14, at 127.
5 6 Advertisement for Buick Skylark Gran Sport, quoted in R. NADER, supra note
44, at 309. "This is a status symbol .... Plymouth Satellite's a decidedly undemo-
cratic machine. Power-hungry people are the ones it really goes for." Advertisement,
quoted in id. at 213.
57 Kessler, Product Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 926 (1967).
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by which society can justifiably express -its dislike or disapprobation
of his conduct.""8 He argued:
[Ail restraint, qua restraint, is an evil .... [W hen there is not
a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person
himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may
prompt him to incur the risk .... [H]e ought, I conceive, to be
only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing
himself to it."
Such conclusions are the logical product of utilitarianism.
Assume that, "loin the occasion of every act he exercises, a human
being is (inevitably) led to pursue that line of conduct which,
according to his view of the case, taken by him at that moment,
will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest
happiness."6  Then the individual should not be hampered by
legislation designed to protect him, except possibly where the law-
giver is ,more capable than the individual of discerning his true
interests: "If I am to seek my pleasure, it must be left to me to
judge concerning my pleasure .... ,61
This position receives less support today. Hart states: "[Plater-
nalism - the protection of people against themselves - is a
perfectly coherent policy. Indeed, it seems very strange in mid-
twentieth century, to insist upon this, for the wane of laissez
faire since Mill's day is one of the commonplaces of social history,
and instances of paternalism now abound in our law, criminal and
civil."62  He notes "a general decline in the belief that individuals
know their own interests best,""3 which he attributes to an increased
awareness that
58J.S. MILL, supra note 51, at 340.
59 Id. at 341-42.
60 J. BENTHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL CODE, quoted in J. NARvEsON, MORALITY AND
UTILITY 58-59 (1967).
61 F. BRADLEY, ETI-nCAL STUDIEs 101 (2d ed. 1927), quoted in J. STONE, HUMAN
LAW AND HUMAN JUsTIcE 137 (1965). "The individual knows what is good for
him.... His own valuations are likely to be only an imperfect projection of what is
good for him. But it is likely to be a closer approximation than an outsider can
give .... The set of individual preferences becomes accepted as the arbiter of their
own welfare." Rothenberg, Values and Value Theory in Economics, in TiE STRUc-
TURE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 221,240-41 (S. Krupp ed. 1966).
GH. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 31-32 (1963). Rudolph von Iher-
ing claimed: "I know of no example of a legal rule which has as its purpose to force
an individual against his own will, in his own interest, for his own good. Where it
appears to do so, it is always in the interest of society." Quoted in J. STONE, supra note
61, at 149. To the extent this is true it is trivial, contributing little more than the
observation that society has an interest in the welfare of the individual.
6 3 H. HART, supra note 62, at 32.
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[c]hoices may be made or consent given without adequate reflec-
tion or appreciation of the consequences; or in pursuit of merely
transitory desires; or various predicaments when the judgment is
likely to be clouded; or under inner psychological compulsion; or
under pressure by others of a kind too subtle to be susceptible of
proof in a law court.6
The tastes of the consumer are of course not immutable: "We
may regard him as experimenting, learning, and possibly even
deteriorating as a decision-making mechanism."6 5  Nevertheless
Scitovsky argues that the economist "cannot question and must
accept as given" whatever wants the individual manifests. Will-
ingness to view preferences as parameters without examining their
variability is a result of mesmerization of economic theorists by
the internal logic of indifference analysis.6' Means selected to
satisfy basic drives are largely determined by acquired tastes: "It
is impossible to understand the wants of the individual without
knowing the society within which he lives, for all of his specific
wants are determined by that society .... Even the iconoclast has
his images chosen for him.68 Since, as Galbraith notes, "[tihe
further a man is removed from physical need the more open he is
to persuasion - or management - as to what he buys,"6 disre-
gard of consumer preferences need not always be deemed desecra-
tion.
That community welfare can be increased through selective in-
terference with consumer sovereignty does not, of course, necessarily
justify legislative intervention in general. As the history of the
64 Id. at 33. "Bentham, as we know, held that every man is the best judge of his
own interest. Taken as it stands, this simply isn't true." J. NARvESON, supra note 60,
at 84. "[T]here is the almost overwhelming weight of evidence . . . that people are
often confused about their own feelings, do not know what they want, etc." Church-
man, On the Intercomparison of Utilities, in THE STRUCTUR OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
243, 251-52 (S. Krupp ed. 1966).
65 Peston, Changing Utility Functions, in ESSAYS IN MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
233 (M. Shubik ed. 1967).
66 T. SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 29 (1951).
67 [it is only comparatively recently that economists have unfrozen those
preference-and-indifference fields and recognized - and incorporated in
their theories - that people learn from experience; that tastes and habits
are not just there, but are acquired, developed; that utilities change; and
that they change in an influenceable and predictable way. . .. [Q]uite
typically all kinds of functions are made to change, but not tastes. In short,
cognitive structures are thought of not as acquired but simply as possessed....
Such a view collides of course rather sharply with the thesis that "all
behavior [is] scanning or sensory search." Fels, supra note 12, at 115.
6 8 G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 90 (1947).
6 9 J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUsTRIAL STATE 202 (1967).
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American prohibition movement dramatically demonstrates, ° there
is no reliable means of determining when controls will prove bene-
ficial: "ITihe 'incalculability' of the 'calculus' of the greatest happi-
ness of the greatest number is a strong and constant temptation to
those in power to practise.., moulding and manipulation." 1 Gain
from measures such as the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act would nevertheless appear worth the risk of occasional
abuse of the power to restrict.
The impact of the prohibitory provisions of the National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act is illustrated in Figure 3. Here
we measure safety and a composite of other desirable character-
istics, denominated power, along the vertical and horizontal axes
respectvely. If choice is unimpeded, the consumer will as before
select that combination of qualities represented by point A, where
indifference curve I2 is tangent to budget line xy.
1!
IV"
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FIGuRE 3
70 See A. SINcLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF ExcEss (1962).
7 1 J. STONE, supra note 61, at 139.
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Suppose government controls preclude purchase of speed char-
acteristics in amounts greater than Oz. If the effect of regulation
on other drivers is for the moment disregarded, choice will be
restricted by constraint xz and the individual will attempt to
maximize his satisfaction by location at point B. However, similar
restrictions on all other automobile purchases create advantageous
externalities. Therefore, each individual will benefit from
increased safety at whatever quantity of power he may select.
Government intervention limiting power to Oz will thus shift the
budget constraint from xy to wz. Consumer equilibrium is now
at point C, arbitrarily placed on indifference curve 12.
Safety at any level of power selected is a function of the strict-
ness of government standards. If indifference curves have their
customary shape and regulation requires a reduction in power, the
individual will always locate at the kink in the budget line. By
varying the severity of controls the government can thus establish
equilibrium at any point on the curved line vA. Assume all
consumers have identical tastes and income and can accurately
specify their preference patterns. Then the government can maxi-
mize satisfaction by limiting power to Oz', establishing budget
constraint w'z' and causing selection of point C', where vA is
tangent to indifference curve 13, the highest indifference curve the
individual can reach. Consumer nonhomogeneity will require
legislative compromise but will not destroy the optimization prin-
ciple.
However paternalism may prevent Congress from accepting
manifested consumer preference patterns at face value. The Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act appears premised in
part on the assumption that, even disregarding externalities, the in-
dividual will be better off with greater safety and less power than he
would select if unconstrained. This view implies that there exists
a second set of indifference curves, including, say, Ii and 102, which
represents the true preferences of the consumer. The aim of the
legislation is to manipulate options available to the individual so
that in attempting to maximize satisfaction as represented by his
presumably mistaken ideas of what is good for him he actually
achieves the highest possible level of welfare as determined by
government insight. In Figure 3 point C', the optimum position
if consumer preferences are considered controlling, lies on indif-
ference curve I1. By further restricting maximum permissible
power to quantity Oz", however, equilibrium can be shifted to C",
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on budget constraint w"z", where vA is tangent to I2, the highest
attainable new indifference curve.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act and the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 are attempts to increase the
value of community consumption 'by restricting the freedom of the
producer. As such they are 'based on reasoning antithetical to the
principle of nonintervention of classical economic theory. In this
article I have attempted to demonstrate that their effect will be not
to impede attainment of ideal equilibrium but rather to increase
welfare by tending to correct imperfections in the market mecha-
nism. Thus, they correctly implement the overriding Smithian stand-
ard that "[clonsumption is the sole end and purpose of all produc-
tion; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only
so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.
The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd
to attempt to prove it.
''r2
72A . SMITH, AN INQUIRY iNTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES Op THE WEALTH
OF NATiONs 625 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
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